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Abstract 
 
 
The purpose of the thesis relates to the Quality anomaly observed in the US equity market, where 
stocks with Quality characteristics tend to outperform and have higher risk adjusted returns. By 
dissecting the Quality anomaly, the thesis aims to analyze the drivers of the over performance of 
Quality and investigate the presence of a systematic Quality premium. From previous research, three 
areas have been identified as theoretical gaps – the magnitude of selection bias, how quality performs 
during different market conditions and if Quality has explanatory power in a cross sectional setting. 
By forming an aggregated, zero-investment Quality portfolio, regress it on traditional factor models, 
analyze condition Beta and perform a Fama Macbeth Cross Sectional Regression, the thesis aspires 
to address these gaps. Four main conclusions were brought to light; 
(i) The lack of a coherent definition of the Quality factor impose selection bias;  
(ii) There are tendencies towards flight to Quality – the risk-adjusted returns in excess of the 
market is mainly generated in down markets and over longer periods;  
(iii) The presence of a Quality premium is observed. When regressed on multifactor models, 
the Quality portfolio generates monthly significant alpha in between 0.431 - 0.549 %. 
Furthermore, the Quality portfolio loads significantly negative on market Beta, and 
tendencies are observed on significant negative factor loadings on SMB and HML. Thus, 
traditional factor models cannot explain the Quality premium.  
(iv) The premium appears to be caused by systematic errors rather than exposure to a 
systematic source of risk, as the Quality anomaly becomes evident first during longer 
time periods or during crises. In a CSR, Quality cannot be rejected to improve the model, 
but as such, it is also concluded not to be a compensation for carrying a systematic risk 
premium.     
  
 3 
Table of contents 
1 Introduction 4 
1.1 Background 4 
1.2 Literature Review and Previous Research 7 
1.2.1 Factor Investing 7 
1.2.2 The Quality Anomaly 8 
1.3 Theoretical Gap and Research Questions 13 
1.4 Purpose 14 
2 Theory 15 
2.1 The Capital Asset Pricing Model 15 
2.2 The Mean Variance Framework 16 
2.3 Arbitrage Pricing Theory 16 
2.4 The Efficient Market Hypothesis and Systematic Risk versus Systematic Errors 17 
2.4.1 Systematic Risk 17 
2.4.2 Systematic Errors 18 
2.5 Factor Models 18 
2.5.1 Fama and French Three Factor Model 18 
2.5.2 Carhart Four Factor Model 19 
2.5.3 Fama and French Five Factor Model 19 
2.6 Conditional Beta 20 
3 Method 22 
3.1 Determining Geography 22 
3.2 Collecting Data 22 
3.3 Constructing a Quality Screen 22 
3.4 Decomposing the Quality Screen 26 
3.5 Fama Macbeth and the Cross Sectional Regression 26 
3.6 Critical Perspectives 31 
4 Empirical Findings 33 
4.1 Building a Quality Screen 33 
4.2 Conditional Beta Analysis 38 
4.3 Decomposing the Quality Factor 38 
4.4 Fama Macbeth (Cross Sectional Regression) and Systematic Risk Premiums 39 
4.5 Comparing Factors 41 
4.6 Descriptive Statistics 42 
4.6.1 Performance Statistics by Sub-Periods 42 
4.6.2 Characteristics of Quality 44 
5 Analysis 47 
6 Conclusions 52 
6.1 Lack of coherent definitions impose selection bias 52 
6.2 High performance in down markets – flight to Quality 52 
6.3 Presence of a Quality Premium 53 
6.4 Systematic errors rather than systematic risk 54 
7 Future research 55 
8 References 56 
 
 4 
1 Introduction 
The first chapter of the essay provides a brief background to the evolvement of factor investing, from both an academic as 
well as an institutional perspective. This is followed by a literature review, which puts the Quality Anomaly in context, 
in terms of estimation techniques and previous research. Subsequently, a short review of the anomaly is discussed, 
followed by identification of theoretical gap, our research questions and the purpose of this essay. 
 
1.1 Background 
Equity risk premium is a multi-facetted expression, but it is often used in the context of the 
framework presented by Ross (1976), who stated that expected return of a financial asset can be 
modeled as a function of several sources of risk. In this spirit, empirical finance researchers have 
tried to uncover and determine common characteristics among stocks that exhibit abnormally high 
risk adjusted returns. Analogous to the progress within academia, a trend has emerged amongst 
institutional and retail investors; the inflows to systematic equity factor risk premium strategies, 
mainly through Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs), has exhibited a growth of 31 % CAGR during the 
last five years (Blackrock, 2017).  
Equity risk premium is as mentioned often described in the context of the framework presented by 
Ross (1976), Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT). APT differs from CAPM in the sense that expected 
return of a financial asset can be modeled as a function of several sources of risk, not only the 
market factor, Beta1. Hence, in a general sense, a factor can be thought of as a specific trait, 
important for explaining an asset’s risk and return characteristics. However, the field is broad and 
can also incorporate strategies such as put/call writing strategies, volatility roll down, carry trades, 
total return swaps and repurchase agreements (Bank for International Settlements, 2017). 
Since the framework of CAPM was outlined in the 1950’s and 1960’s, one of the core concepts has 
been diversification – investors are compensated merely for holding market risk and not idiosyncratic 
risk (Markowitz 1952, 1959; Treynor 1961; Sharpe 1964; Lintner 1965; and Mossin 1966). Even if 
diversification is a cornerstone in the theoretical framework, the idea that a market portfolio (a 
capitalization weighted portfolio consisting of all available stocks) provides the highest risk adjusted 
                                                 
1 However, Ross does not state what these factors should be, but the sources of risk (and thus the drivers of asset 
returns) is often assumed to be modeled as either macroeconomic dynamics or theoretical equity market indices.  
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return, is not uncontroversial. Fama (1976) as well as Haugen, Nardin and Baker (1996) showed that 
a cap weighted index will be mean variance efficient only when considered in the context of four 
main assumptions. The first is that all investors have homogenous expectations regarding risk and 
expected return for all securities. Second, there should be no constraint in terms of short-selling. 
Furthermore, the returns from any investor’s portfolio should not be exposed to taxes. Lastly, the 
investment opportunity set, i.e the universe of tradable stocks, should be restricted to the stocks 
included in the cap-weighted index. Even in Wilshire 5000 (the most comprehensive equity index in 
the US), the fourth condition is violated (Haugen, Nardin, Baker, 1996). Neither is it realistic that the 
other assumptions are fulfilled. Absent above mentioned assumptions, even the most comprehensive 
cap-weighted portfolios engage positions within the efficient set. This finding implies that there is no 
practical way of implementing a “truly” mean variance efficient portfolio, using a broad index. This 
might be one of the explanatory sources as to why factor investing has increased in popularity 
throughout the years. 
Fama et. al. (1969) and Fama (1991) are famous for outlining the Efficient Market Hypothesis, which 
has been central in testing to what extent stock market returns can be forecasted. There is a quite 
broad consensus amongst contemporary financial economist that markets are hard to predict, and 
any achievement of doing so is a result of mere chance (Bogle, 2009; Malkiel, 1995, 2012; Gruber, 
1996; Barras et al, 2010; Berk and Binsbergen, 2012; Kosowski et al, 2006; Wermers, 2003; Jones and 
Wermers, 2011; Kinnel, 2010; Arnott, Berkin, and Ye, 2000; Ibbotson and Kaplan, 2000).  
In this context, the chase for alpha and the employment of active management investment strategies, 
appear to be a futile endeavor. This, combined with the empirical arguments against the idea that 
cap-weighted indices are mean variance efficient, leaves investors with a confusing setup. However, 
when the returns of active managers that consequently beat their respective benchmark is dissected, 
an interesting conclusion comes to light. Fama and French (2010) as well as Ang, Goetzmann and 
Schaefer (2009) showed that a majority of successful mutual funds tend to be exposed to well 
documented risk factors in the equity markets. In a similar note, Mok, Bender and Hammond (2013) 
found that about 50 % of the excess returns of mutual funds could be explained by the Fama French 
Three Factor Model. Thus, this implies that there is something systematic in the alpha generated by 
these managers. One of the conclusions in Mok et al is that some of this alpha is not a stochastic 
residual, but rather a systematic, extractable, dimension of equity return that can be harvested by 
using systematic factor strategies.  
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Lately, this line of thinking has been widely adopted by the industry. BlackRock, the world’s largest 
asset manager, earns a significant portion of their revenue from passive investing solutions and 
Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs) (BlackRock, 2017). Assets allocated to ETFs amounts to 
approximately USD 2 885 Bn, corresponding to 16 % of total assets under management in the US. 
Furthermore, the growth rate for ETFs during the last five years has been more than double that of 
other investment vehicles, aggregated (ETFGI, 2017).  
The increased demand from investors combined with a vast contribution within academia on equity 
risk premium, has enabled access to low cost ETFs in the equity markets2. These investment 
strategies are mainly constructed by using a broad parent index, but assigning different member 
weightings than in the cap weighted index. The most popular strategies base their member 
weightings on factors such as low Volatility, Dividend, Value, Quality, Size, Growth and Momentum 
rather than market capitalization.  
The implementation is often determined by using fundamental metrics as proxies for various risk 
premiums. One such factor, that has been more frequently and widely adopted, is Quality. In a 
general context, Quality screens aim to capture the premium of companies that have stable business 
models as well as growing profits, low leverage and solid cash flows (MSCI, 2013). Thus, the Quality 
strategy is often communicated as a way of mimicking the returns of investment guru’s such as 
Warren Buffet or Benjamin Graham. However, there is no coherent way of defining Quality, and 
even if various Quality screens have performed well in the past, there are different opinions as to 
why they have outperformed the market and if they will continue to do so going forward.  
This essay aims at dissecting the Quality Anomaly, and investigating potential sources of its historical 
outperformance. To fulfil the purpose, the essay is divided in three sub areas: investigating selection 
bias, the performance of Quality and Quality as a systematic risk factor. These three areas are 
identified as gaps from previous research. Before these are described more in detail, a section of 
previous research is presented, which puts the Quality Anomaly in context.  
 
                                                 
2 The cost for strategy ETF:s issued by iShares (BlackRock) is between 5 – 75 basis points annually, 
and the vast majority has net expenses of 20 basis points (iShares, 2017). 
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1.2 Literature Review and Previous Research 
 
1.2.1 Factor Investing 
CAPM can be viewed as the first factor model for asset prices. It uses only the market Beta as a 
factor, important for explaining asset returns (Markowitz 1952, 1959; Treynor 1961; Sharpe 1964; 
Lintner 1965; Mossin 1966; and Black 1972). Since the CAPM framework was outlined, a lot of 
research has been conducted in the spirit of Ross’ APT (1976). Subsequently, a lot of evidence has 
been put forward to strengthen the existence of certain risk premiums in the equity markets, most of 
them starting from a point where they see CAPM as an obsolete model that lacks explanatory power. 
Before these academic efforts are descried more in detail, an outline of previous research regarding 
factor methodology is presented.  
Connor (1995) stated that there are three main categories of factors: macroeconomic, statistical, and 
fundamental. Macroeconomic factors can for instance be surprises in PMI, changes in various 
business cycle variables, inflation and changes in the yield curve. (See also Chen, Ross, and Roll 
(1986)).  
Statistical factor models on the other hand takes advantage of various statistical estimation 
techniques, such as principal components analysis. The principal components analysis method selects 
a linear combination of asset returns which contribute with the highest variance (Egloff, Leippold, 
Wu 2010; Litterman, Scheinkman, 1991; Stock, Watson 1999; Johnson & Wichern 2009). The 
principal component analysis was developed by Pearson (1901) and Hotelling (1933), but one of the 
more cited modern reference is Jolliffe (2002). There is a vast spectrum of methods concerning 
estimation techniques, and except from principal component analysis, some of the more frequently 
used techniques are panel regressions, Bayesian models and latent factor models, to mention a few 
(Miller, 2006).   
Fundamental factors aim to capture certain characteristics among stocks, and to be a proxy of traits 
that are not directly observable. Fundamental factors have been thoroughly studied since the 
framework of APT was outlined, as a part of the field of academic asset pricing. Among the first to 
describe the prominence of individual stock traits as an explanatory variable of stock returns was 
Fama and Macbeth (1973). They could not reject the hypothesis that no measure of risk, in addition 
to Beta, systematically affected expected returns. They created a framework for testing for various 
risk premiums in the equity market, the so called Fama Macbeth Regressions. Due to this 
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contribution, the foundation for many empirical papers regarding equity risk premiums was outlined.  
One of the most cited and well known academic efforts in the field of fundamental factors originates 
from the research of Eugene Fama and Kenneth French in the early 1990s. Fama and French (1992, 
1993) put forward a model explaining US equity market returns with three factors: the “market” 
(defined as in the traditional CAPM), the size factor (a sort based on large capitalization stocks 
versus small capitalization stocks) and the value factor (high book-to-market value of equity versus 
low book-to-market value of equity). Fama and French concluded that market Beta has a low 
explanatory power in terms of explaining the cross-sectional variation in the returns of stocks and 
bonds, implying that the traditional CAPM framework is insufficient as an explanatory model for the 
drivers of asset returns. Throughout the past decades, empirical finance researchers have studied a 
multitude of auxiliary stock traits, ranging from cash flow-, income statement- and balance sheet 
metrics, in order to unfold new fundamentally based factors in the equity markets.   
1.2.2 The Quality Anomaly 
Quality, as an investment strategy, seeks to capture the excess returns of companies that are efficient 
in an operational sense, are stable in terms of earnings and cash flows, have low leverage, are highly 
profitable and associated with low operational risk. Even if this definition is quite vague, these traits 
and this line of thinking have been popular in the active investment industry for decades. But as a 
more quantitative phenomenon, Quality is a rather new occurrence. As a dimension in factor 
investing, Quality was popularized first by Asness, Frazzini, and Pedersen (2013), but it is still not 
consistently defined. This indicates that the risk sources behind a Quality screen has not yet been 
uncovered and documented thoroughly. 
Like other stock market anomalies, the Quality anomaly has been identified from empirical tests of 
the Capital Asset Pricing Model of Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965) and Black (1972), and later the 
multifactor models of Fama and French (1992) and Carhart (1997). The evidence from an empirical 
stand point indicates that portfolios sorted on Quality metrics such as profitability, earnings quality 
and safety have produced higher risk-adjusted returns relative to the market portfolio. However, the 
size of the premium is not coherent; it varies depending on which metrics are used, the time period 
investigated, the geographical market or stock sample examined as well as the asset pricing model 
used to measure portfolio risk. This leaves a somewhat disintegrated picture of the Quality anomaly. 
One of the first published Quality screens goes back to Benjamin Graham and the book “The 
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Intelligent Investor” from 1949. In chapter 14, Graham outlines a screen of combined financial 
metrics (Graham, 1949). Graham’s strategy was built on the premise that undervalued and 
underappreciated companies, that meet some given criteria, should be subject to higher expected 
returns. Graham considered metrics such as debt ratios, earnings stability, past earnings and dividend 
growth to be as important as valuation metrics such as price-to-earnings and price-to-book ratios. 
Another publication of Graham and Dodd (Graham, Dodd, 1934, page 351, Security Analysis) 
outlines a more rigor definition of Quality. This line of thinking was adapted by Graham’s disciple, 
the famous Warren Buffet. Buffet’s investment company Berkshire Hathaway has realized a Sharpe-
ratio of 0.76, higher than any other stock or mutual fund with a history of more than 30 years, and 
Berkshire has consecutively produced significant alpha compared to the CAPM (Asness et al, 2013).  
Another impactful individual, who share a similar investment philosophy as Buffet, Dodd and 
Graham, is Peter Lynch. His efforts at the Magellan Fund and Fidelity Investments have made him 
an investment guru in the asset management industry. The common denominator is that they all 
invest in stocks that exhibit the Quality characteristics discussed above. Due to their high returns in 
excess of the stock market, their strategies have been subject to dissection by both practitioners as 
well as academia.  
Some of the early research on statistical relationships of earnings and stock performance links back 
to Foster (1977); Watts and Leftwich (1977); Albrecht et al. (1977); Beaver (1970); and Griffin 
(1977), indicating that profitable stocks tend to outperform broad benchmarks. In the 1980’s, 
Graham and Dodd’s Earnings Quality measure was re-introduced into the academic sphere, as a 
descriptive characteristic of earnings for academic researchers (O’Glove, 1987; Lev 1989), and thus 
forming a more coherent view on quality as a definition. 
Sloan (1996) was one of the first to validate the excess returns to high earnings quality stocks, where 
accruals proxy for earnings quality. Other examples of studies of this type are Lev and Sougiannis 
(1996), who evaluate how investor responds to increased or decreased earnings and accruals. This is 
was also described by Landsman et al. (2008). Bender and Nielsen (2013) and Kozlov and Petajisto 
(2013) both reconfirm the accruals effect, but for the the 2000s. They find similar results, namely 
that the accruals anomaly persisted throughout the time period examined in generating positive 
alpha. Leippold and Lohre (2010) concluded that in 22 of the 26 markets they examined, the accruals 
constituted an evident anomaly.  
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In a similar manor, Huang (2009) finds that firms with stable cash flows tend to outperform, 
measured as volatility of cash flow. The paper argued that cash flow volatility provides a better 
measure of the overall riskiness of a company than accruals.  
Dichev (1998), Griffin and Lemmon (2002), Vassalou and Xing (2004) and Campbell et al. (2008) all 
found that financial distress, as defined by trailing financial ratios, on average is associated with lower 
returns. The result applies for different markets and during diverse time periods. This was also 
investigated by George and Hwang (2010), by studying low leverage companies. The authors showed 
that there is a significant return premium in companies with low leverage, and when the results were 
put in a risk-adjusted return context, the results became even more clear. Another effort in this space 
was made by Penman, Richardson and Tuna (2007). They separated the book-to-market ratio into an 
asset and a leverage component. From this, they concluded that the leverage component of the 
book-to-market ratio negatively predicts to stock returns.   
Other modern endeavors within this field, generated in the spirit of Graham’s screen, have been 
made by Pitroski (2000) and Greenblatt (2005). Pitroski (2000) proposed an investment screen, based 
on 9 financial metrics, and the screen outperformed and produced significant alpha. The investment 
strategy bought expected winners and shorted expected losers, by filtering on financial metrics, and it 
generated 23 % annual return between 1976 and 1996. The strategy was robust over time. The screen 
has been revisited by many practitioners since it was outlined, and the screen has continued to 
perform well (Hyde, 2015). 
Greenblatt published a book in 2005, “The Little Book that Beats the Stock Market”, in which he 
outlined a stock screen, called “The Magic Formula” (Greenblatt, 2005). A dissection of the strategy 
was done by Novy-Marx in 2013, where the results indicated that the investment strategy produced 
significant results (alpha of 2,8 % yearly) (Novy-Marx, 2013).  Before this, Novy-Marx (2012) 
identified a proxy for profitability that was concluded to be closely correlated with average return. 
The sample at hand was the US stock market, and the time period spanned from 1963 to 2010. 
Stocks with high profitability characteristics produced alpha of 1,44 % per annum, and the return 
could not be explained by CAPM, Fama French Three Factor Model or Carhart’s Four Factor 
Model. Moreover, the alphas were significant over time.  
Dechow, Ge, and Schrand (2010) made a comprehensive review of how earnings persistence, 
accruals, earnings smoothness and loss avoidance affect stock prices. When weighing in on more 
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than 300 papers (many originating from the accounting field) they concluded the following. First, 
abnormal accruals tend to have positive persistence. Second, investors appear to recognize the 
distinction between High and Low Quality firms (such as abnormal accruals and normal accruals), 
but they do not fully incorporate the implications into price. Third, the literature is inconsistent 
regarding the causality from observing a quality company (in terms of fundamentals) to the 
consequences for future period earnings. Some papers find that quality is predictable, whereas others 
do not.  
A paper that merged fundamental metrics with a multi factor asset model was outlined by Chen, 
Novy-Marx and Zhang (2011). They included ROE in an alternative three factor model, with the aim 
to improve the explanation the cross-sectional variation stock returns. They showed that a long-short 
ROE factor earned a statistically significant average return of 0,71 % per month from 1972 to 2010, 
thus confirming that ROE can serve as a proxy for profitability and earnings quality.  
Moreover, Novy-Marx (2014) finds that gross profitability performs relatively better than quality 
strategies such as Graham’s quality, especially among large-cap US stocks. They also concluded that 
profitability has approximately the same explanatory power as book-to-market in explaining the cross 
section of average stock returns. 
Aharoni, Grundy, and Zeng (2013) document a somewhat weaker but still statistically reliable 
relation between firm investment and average return. (See also, Haugen and Baker 1996; Cohen, 
Gompers, and Vuolteenaho 2002; Fairfield, Whisenant, and Yohn 2003; Titman, Wei, and Xie 2004; 
Fama and French 2008, 2014.). A more extensive paper, published by Asness, Frazzini, and Pedersen 
(2013) indicates that high quality companies, measured by three categories (profitability, stable 
growth, and high payout ratio) has significantly higher risk-adjusted returns than the market 
portfolio.  
In 2013, a paper by Frazzini, Kabiller, and Pedersen was published, called Buffet’s Alpha. Buffet’s 
investment company Birkshire Hathaway has consequently produced significant alpha, but the alpha 
was found to be insignificant when controlling for exposures to other factors than Beta. This spurred 
an interesting discussion regarding to what extent Buffet’s Alpha could be extracted using factors in 
the equity market (Frazzini, Kabiller, Pedersen, 2013). 
In 2014, Fama French reiterated their factor approach from the 90s, in a paper called “A Five Factor 
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Asset Pricing Model”. They extend the original three factor model with two additional measures – 
RMW and CMA. RMW stands for Robust Minus Weak, and is a sort based on the robustness of 
profits and earnings power. CMA stands for Conservative Minus Aggressive, hence sorting stocks 
based on the level of investments made by the company. Their results indicate that the model 
provides a good description of asset returns; however, the results were not statistically significant 
(Fama, French 2014).  
Asness et al. (2014) found that portfolios sorted on profitability, safety and earnings quality have 
generated statistically significant alphas, both globally as well as in the US. The average profitability 
premium in the US over the period from 1956 to 2012 was 0,4 % per month, and the Four Factor 
Model alpha amounted to 0,53 % per month. 
Despite the pervasiveness of quality investment strategies, not much research has attempted to 
explain why quality outperforms. In theory, it is reasonable that quality stocks should command 
higher prices. As Asness et al. (2014) point out, investors should be willing to pay a higher price for 
companies with quality characteristics, as these companies tend to have either higher expected cash 
flows or lower volatility in cash flows- Due to this effect, this kind of companies would not 
necessarily imply higher risk-adjusted returns, since they are priced higher.  
To sum up previous research efforts, there is a clear indication that a quality screen, in various 
constellations, exhibit higher risk adjusted returns than the market, and that return patterns cannot 
be explained by the CAPM. The main challenge seems to be how to define the quality factor 
consistently and objectively by uncovering reliable proxies for the sources that drive the return of 
Quality stocks. As with other market anomalies, this premium may exist due to a variety of aspects, 
and the critiques range from insufficient risk models, measurement errors, data mining effects and 
overfitting, to behavioral biases (survivorship bias, home country bias, familiarity bias and selection 
bias to name some) and institutional constraints, including restrictions on short selling, tax effects et 
cetera (Davis, 2001). This is more thoroughly discussed in the Method section.  
Exhibit 1 summarizes eight of the most widely studied factors.  
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Exhibit 1: Well documented Systematic Factors from the Academic Research  
 
Companies that exhibits one or more of the characteristics outlined above, also tend to exhibit 
certain patterns in stock returns on average. These patterns cannot always be explained by the 
CAPM. In 2008, Fama and French (2008) dissected some of the most frequently used factors to 
conclude that anomalies can be linked to factors, in a cross sectional setting. Thus, some of these 
traits are considered to constitute anomalies that are left unexplained by the traditional framework of 
Modern Portfolio Theory.  
1.3 Theoretical Gap and Research Questions 
As described above, previous research indicates that quality screens generate higher risk adjusted 
Factor 
 
Explanation 
Value Captures excess returns to stocks that have low prices relative to 
their fundamental value 
Low Size Captures excess returns of smaller firms (by market 
capitalization) relative to their larger counterparts 
Momentum Reflects excess returns to stocks with stronger past performance 
Low Volatility Captures excess returns to stocks with lower than average 
volatility, Beta, and/or  
Dividend Yield Captures excess returns to stocks that have higher-than-average 
dividend yields 
Quality Captures excess returns of stocks that are characterized by low 
debt, stable earnings growth, and other “quality” metrics 
Growth Captures companies that have high historical sales and EPS 
growth, and high expected growth in EPS. 
Liquidity Captures companies that have low liquidity in their tradable 
assets 
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returns, but there is not yet a clear, quantitative definition of quality as a factor. Neither has previous 
research been able to produce coherent results as to why quality characteristics tend to outperform 
the market. There is no clear explanation to why this phenomenon occurs; is it due to errors in 
investor expectations, or could there be a systematic, non-diversifiable source of risk, that investors 
demand higher returns for? Quality metrics seem to constitute a proxy for some source of risk, due 
to the excess returns generated over long time periods, but there is no broadly accepted explanation 
today. The most prevailing explanation is a “residual” remark; the reason why quality has 
outperformed historically is due to errors in expectations. Thus, the theoretical gap that this essay 
focus on is the lack of explanations of the quality anomaly. 
Therefore, the scope of the thesis is to investigate the following areas:  
Magnitude of Selection Bias: Create zero investment portfolios for single metrics, frequently used 
in the literature, to analyze the magnitude of the selection bias. Another aspect of the selection bias 
will also be analyzed, namely that two Quality portfolios are constructed, one based on previous 
research and one screen based on Svenska Handelsbanken (SHB) selection of metrics, and how 
different combinations of metrics affect the portfolio.  
The Performance of Quality: To enhance the understanding the Quality anomaly, the thesis 
analyzes how Quality performs during different market conditions, as well as outlining if there exist a 
premium is in terms of alpha, in a multifactor setting.  
The Quality Factor: Can a zero-investment portfolio, which is long High Quality stocks and short 
Low Quality stocks, help explain a larger proportion of the cross-sectional variation in equity returns, 
thus stating a systematic source of risk, or are the returns linked to a systematic error among 
investors?  
1.4 Purpose 
The purpose of the thesis is therefore to investigate why stocks with Quality characteristics tend to 
outperform and have higher risk adjusted returns. By dissecting the Quality anomaly, this essay aims 
to investigate the presence of a systematic Quality premium. 
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2 Theory 
The chapter covers the main theories and academic concepts within the field of financial economics which relates to 
market efficiency and asset pricing models. The theories presented will serve as the basis for the thesis, providing the 
background and foundation essential to analyzing the Quality anomaly.  
 
2.1 The Capital Asset Pricing Model 
The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) is considered the foundation of asset pricing theory and 
constitutes the framework of Modern Portfolio Theory. It was developed by joint contributions 
from Markowitz (1952, 1959), Treynor (1961), Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965), Mossin (1966) and 
Black (1972). The basis of the CAPM relies on the idea that there are two types of risk from which 
returns are generated – Systematic risk and unsystematic risk. Systematic risk can be viewed as 
market risks and hence cannot be diversified away, while unsystematic risk, so called idiosyncratic 
risk, is specific risk to an individual asset and thus uncorrelated to market movements. The 
unsystematic risk can be eliminated by diversification, why investors should only be compensated for 
carrying systematic risk. The CAPM provides a framework for measuring the systematic risk as a 
function between expected return and exposure to the market (Beta).  
 
𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓 +  𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓� 
 
Where rit is the return of any asset i during time t, 𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓 is the risk free rate, 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the sensitivity of 
asset i to the market return, 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. Usually, this equation is determined by regression analysis. If (𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓)  is defined as a vector of excess market returns, X, and 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is defined as a vector of asset 
i:s returns, Y, OLS can be used to estimate the 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, by (X’X)-1 X’Y. 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 can also be estimated using 
GLS if autocorrelation or heteroscedasticity is observed. Then an intertemporal homoscedastic 
covariance matrix Ψt can be used to estimate 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. Markowitz proves that under certain assumptions, 
the 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is defined as: 
𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 ( 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖, 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖)𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑟𝑟 (𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖)  
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2.2 The Mean Variance Framework 
The Mean Variance Framework, popularly referred to as Modern Portfolio Theory, MPT, states that 
an investor wants to maximize the return for any given level of risk. MPT assumes that investors are 
risk averse, implying that an investor facing two portfolios with similar return characteristics but 
different risk levels, will chose the less risk one.  
 
By this logic, an investor face a trade-off in terms of risk and return, and an investor will only 
increase the level of risk if she is compensated by higher expected returns. The relationship will be 
the same for all investors, but investors will evaluate the trade-off differently as each investor’s utility 
function differs in terms of risk aversion. Consequently, the framework outlines a concept referred 
to as the efficient frontier, showing the combination of all available assets, which in turn shows the 
efficient set – the portfolios with the highest return for every level of risk. (Markowitz, 1952) 
 
The efficient set shown below:  
 
 
 
2.3 Arbitrage Pricing Theory 
As an alternative to the Mean Variance Asset Pricing Model proposed by Sharpe (1964), Lintner 
(1965) and Treynor (1961), Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) was introduced by Ross in 1976. In the 
Mean Variance Model, the linear relation between return and risk (Beta) is used in order to price 
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assets. The APT builds on CAPM’s ability to price risky assets, but relies on the argument that the 
return of assets is driven by various macro-economic factors rather than only the exposure to the 
market factor. Ross (1976) asserts that there are an infinite number of factors, both macro-economic 
and firm-specific, on which the assets expected return depend on. The APT formula is depicted 
below: 
𝑟𝑟 = 𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓 +  𝛽𝛽1𝐹𝐹1 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐹𝐹2 + ⋯+ 𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛𝐹𝐹𝑛𝑛 
 
Where r is the rate of return, rf the risk-free rate, βi represents the sensitivity of asset i in relation to a 
factor, and Fi is the systematic factor.  
 
The APT is far less restrictive in terms of its assumptions than the CAPM, and leaves more room for 
the investor to customize and develop a model for a specific asset’s return. However, this implies 
that the investor must in turn identify each of the factors used in every specific asset, which is no 
trivial matter. In the CAPM, which can be viewed as a simplified model of the APT, only one factor 
needs to be considered: the risk of a particular asset relative to the market.  
 
2.4 The Efficient Market Hypothesis and Systematic Risk versus Systematic Errors 
In general, there are two main camps in the debate over what drives factor returns—one based on 
the view that markets are efficient and that factors reflect “systematic” sources of risk, and one based 
on the view that investors either exhibit behavioral biases or are subject to different constraints. 
These constraints can be such as time horizons, investable geography, ability to use leverage or tax 
effects (Ross, 1976).  
2.4.1 Systematic Risk 
In accordance with the APT (Ross, 1976) and the Efficient Market Hypotheses (Fama et al 1969), 
systematic risk refers to the risk attached to the factors; since these factors provide the stock its traits 
and the risk to these traits cannot be diversified away given an efficient market and rational investors, 
thus making the sources of risk ‘systematic’. A premium in terms of excess return should therefore 
be earned for companies carrying systematic risk. Systematic risk could for instance be found in 
exposure macroeconomic factors, such as growth and inflation, in factors such as Value, Size and 
Momentum, since these are sensitive to shocks in the economy and thus must carry a return 
premium for the investor. Another example of systematic risk can be found in the small cap 
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premium, which is believed to be due to exposure to stocks characterized by low liquidity (Liu, 
2006), low transparency (Zhang, 2006) and are more likely to be distressed (Chan and Chen, 1991; 
Dichev, 1998). 
2.4.2 Systematic Errors 
Another explanation for the excess return earned by factors is due to investors’ systematic errors. 
One suggestion, which can be derived from literature in behavioral finance, asserts that investors 
exhibit biases, such as chasing winners, preferring familiar investments and overconfidence, which 
can explain the observed factor anomalies in the market. Another camp within those who argue for 
systematic errors as explanation for factor anomalies, suggests that even though investors behave 
rational, they can be subject to different constraints. Investor constraints and frictions from 
regulatory and industry practices are argued to affect factor performances. For instance, studies have 
shown that low volatility stocks earn a premium over time horizons stretching beyond 10 years, while 
most investors prefer a much shorter time horizon and stocks with high liquidity. Therefore, an 
investor with a longer time horizon should earn higher returns, a premium, for carrying the horizon 
risk. 
2.5 Factor Models 
2.5.1 Fama and French Three Factor Model 
In 1993, Eugene Fama and Kenneth French introduced an extension to the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model where two variables, besides the market factors, are presented. In the Fama French Thee 
Factor Model (1993), both size and book-to-market ratio, together with the market factor, is used in 
order to explain the cross-section of average returns on assets. Fama and French (1992) finds that 𝛽𝛽, 
used alone or in combination with other variables, gives limited information in regards to average 
returns, while size, leverage, E/P and book-to-market equity does however carry explanatory power. 
Especially the two variables size (ME) and book-to-market equity (BE/ME) are useful in explaining 
the cross-section of average stock returns. The size factor used by Fama and French (1993) is 
measured as “Small (market cap) minus Big” (SMB) and relies on the findings that small firms tend 
to outperform larger firms. The excess return from a portfolio consisting of firms with small market 
capitalization (S) is taken over the excess return of a portfolio with large capitalization firms (B). The 
book-to-market factor, “High (book-to-market) minus Low” (HML), is constructed in a similar 
fashion, taking excess return from a portfolio consistent of firms with a high book-to-market ration 
(H) over the excess return of a portfolio with low book-to-market ratio firms (L). This is due to the 
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fact that firms with high book-to-market ratio, known as value stocks, have a tendency to 
outperform firms with low book-to-market ratio.  
 
𝑟𝑟 = 𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓 +  𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖�𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 − 𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓� + 𝛽𝛽𝑠𝑠(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆) +  𝛽𝛽𝑣𝑣(𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻) 
 
Where r denotes the expected rate of return, rf is the risk-free rate and rm represents the return of the 
market portfolio. βm is analogous to the classical β but not equal to it, since we now have an 
additional two factors at play, SMB and HML. βs and βv denotes the sensitivity to these factors 
respectively.  
 
2.5.2 Carhart Four Factor Model 
Carhart (1997) builds on the Fama and French Three Factor Model (1993) by adding an additional 
factor to the model – momentum. While investigating the persistence in mutual fund performance, 
and building of the research on the Momentum factor by Jagadeesh and Titman (1993), Carhart 
(1997) found that stocks with a high return in the past tend to perform well in the next period as 
well. Thus, the momentum factor, “Up (performance) Minus Down” (UMD) was added and 
constructed by taking the excess return of past winners (U) over past losers (D). The Carhart Four 
Factor Model is depicted below: 
 
𝑟𝑟 = 𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓 + 𝛽𝛽��𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 − 𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓� + 𝛽𝛽𝑠𝑠(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆) + 𝛽𝛽𝑣𝑣(𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻) +  𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖(𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆𝑈𝑈) 
 
Where r denotes the expected rate of return, rf is the risk-free rate and rm represents the return of the 
market portfolio, βm represents the sensitivity to the market, βs, βv and βmom denotes the sensitivity to 
the size-, value- and momentum-factor respectively.  
 
2.5.3 Fama and French Five Factor Model 
Fama and French (2014) also built on their original Thee Factor Model by including an additional 
two factors – Profitability and an Investment factor. The argument for adding these two variables 
can be derived from the Dividend Discount Model (Fama, French 2006), which supplies further 
evidence that profitability and investment add to the description of average returns provided by the 
book-to-market ratio. The book-to-market ratio can be calculated by the following formula:  
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𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖
𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖
= 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 � ∑ .∞τ =1  𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖+ τ −  𝑑𝑑𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖+ τ(1 + 𝑟𝑟)τ  �
𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖
 
  
Where 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖  is the market value of the firm at time t,  𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖  is the firm’s book equity,  𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖+τ is the total 
equity earnings for period 𝑡𝑡 +  τ,  𝑑𝑑𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖+τ is the change in book value (i.e firm investment), 𝑟𝑟 is the 
internal rate of return of dividends (a proxy for expected return). It follows that, all else held equal, 
differences in expected profitability  𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖+τ should, in the cross section, be related to the rate of 
return, 𝑟𝑟. Keeping the market-, book-value and the expected change in book value constant, the 
variation in expected earnings should be related to the variation in the rate of return. High expected 
profitability predicts a high rate of return, just as high valuation, 𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡
𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡
, and high rates of expected 
investment should predict a lower expected return.  
 
Novy-Marx (2012) and Aharoni, Gundy and Zeng (2013) identify relationships between expected 
profitability and average return, and investment and average return separately, why an augmented 
version of the Fama and French Three Factor Model (1993) is included with the two factors. In the 
Fama and French Five Factor Model (2014), the profitability factor is measured by the difference in 
returns of portfolios with “Robust” (R) and “Weak” (W) profitability - “Robust minus Weak” 
(RMW). The investment factor is measured in a similar fashion between portfolios of low (C) and 
high (A) investment stocks – “Conservative minus Aggressive” (CMA).  
 
𝑟𝑟 = 𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓 +  𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖�𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 − 𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓� + 𝛽𝛽𝑠𝑠(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆) + 𝛽𝛽𝑣𝑣(𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻) +  𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝(𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅) + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖(𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶) 
 
Where r denotes the expected rate of return, rf is the risk-free rate and rm represents the return of the 
market portfolio, βm represents the sensitivity to the market, βs, βv, βp and βi denotes the sensitivity to 
the size- value-, profitability-, and investment-factor respectively.  
 
2.6 Conditional Beta 
The Sharpe-Lintner-Black model (SLB) is based on the assumption of a positive risk-return tradeoff, 
and asserts that the expected return for any asset can be derived by a positive function of three 
variables: Beta, the risk-free rate and the expected market return. This implies that the only cause for 
systematic differences in returns between assets depend on the asset’s responsiveness to market 
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movements. Although early empirical tests, such as Fama and MacBeth (1973), supported the validity 
of the SLB model, the usefulness of Beta as the sole measure of risk for a security has been 
challenged by at least three arguments. The first argument suggests that Beta is not the most efficient 
measure of systematic risk, but rather systematic responsiveness to macroeconomic variables should 
be measured (Chen et al, 1986). The second argument relies on empirical evidence that security 
returns are affected by unsystematic risk (Lakonishok and Shapiro, 1986). The third argument states 
that there is empirical evidence which indicates the absence of a systematic relationship between Beta 
and security returns (Fama and French 1992). Therefore, the question of Beta’s efficiency and 
completeness arises, and whether or not Beta does in fact measure risk and if there is a risk-return 
tradeoff. 
 
By using realized market returns as a proxy for expected market returns and assuming an inverse 
relationship between realized returns and Beta, when the realized market returns fall below the risk-
free rate, Pettengill, Sundaram and Mathur (1995) are able to find a significant and systematic 
relationship between Beta and returns. Their evidence of a positive risk-return tradeoff, when Beta is 
used as a measure of risk, supports Betas usefulness as a measure of risk, although it might not be 
direct support of the Sharpe-Lintner-Black model.  
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3 Method 
 
In the following section, the methodology of the thesis is described and justified. The gathering of data and the process of 
analyzing it is presented in detail, in combination with critical perspectives and delimitations throughout the process. 
 
3.1 Determining Geography 
The American equity market is chosen due to several reasons. First, the amount of data is extensive, 
both in terms of completeness in a historical context, but also in terms of accounting standards. This 
mitigates some data selection issues. The universe of investable stocks is also larger than for instance 
the European equity market. Furthermore, the American stock market is likely one of the more well-
functioning markets in a global context, in terms of efficiency.  
3.2 Collecting Data 
The Bloomberg terminal was used to collect the data. The data has been gathered from stocks 
incorporated in the Wilshire 5 000 index, the broadest equity index available in the US market. Due 
to data issues, historical performance and reliable accounting variables were only retrievable from 
January 1993. However, throughout the time period investigated, there have been several financial 
and economic crises. Also, during this time period, a lot of progress has been done in terms of factor 
investing, which may affect the results and the pervasiveness of the Quality anomaly as well as other, 
today, well documented factors. Altogether, we believe that the time period captures these aspects 
and thus provides an interesting and sufficient time window for the purpose of the thesis. 
Furthermore, all data is collected monthly, providing a total of 288 observations during the period 
examined, for each asset and each portfolio. Financial stocks are not excluded from the data, due to 
data issues. We observe the universe one time each year, and follow the same process as Fama and 
French (1992). The average number of stocks used each year in the quintiles is 350. With monthly 
data, spanning over a period of 24 years and across 12 metrics, this results in a total of over 2,4 
million data observations. The stocks are weighted equally and as such, each stock has a weight of 
approximately 0,3 %. 
3.3 Constructing a Quality Screen 
Quality can be defined in various ways but is typically associated with profitable companies with low 
leverage and stable earnings. It is rooted in fundamental analysis and thus makes use of an 
assortment of financial data extracted from financial reports of companies. Although the definition 
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of Quality varies in complexity, stretching from simple, one-dimensional metrics such as ROE, to 
multi-metric definitions encompassing a multitude of accounting ratios, the most frequently used 
characteristics of the quality definition can be group in three main categories: Profitability, Safety and 
Quality of earnings.  
Profitability is defined as a company’s ability to generate earnings as compared to its expenses, why 
profitable firms are often referred to as quality firms. Profitability can be measured by different 
accounting ratios such as gross profit over assets (GP/Assets), operating cash flows over assets 
(CF/Assets) and various net profit-based measures, for instance return on equity (ROE), return on 
assets (ROA) and return on invested capital (ROIC). The different ratios provide different insights in 
regards to the financial state of the company, where gross, net and operating margins suggest how 
well the company is at managing its expenses, while ratios such as ROE and ROA give insights to 
the company’s ability in deploying its capital in order to generate returns. Since these ratios can, to 
some extent, be affected by accounting choices, the best suitable metric to represent profitability is a 
subject of controversy. Novy-Marx (2013) argue that the cleanest measure of profitability can be 
found in gross profit, since this metric is relatively unaffected by accounting estimates for accruals 
and non-cash expenses. Index providers however, argue that net profit-based metrics are better 
suited to represent profitability, since net profit measures the profit which accrues to common 
shareholders rather than stakeholders. These are metric such as ROE and ROA (Norges Bank, 
2015). Seasonality is another factor which can affect the profitability metrics, rendering certain 
metrics unsuitable to be compare across different industries.  
High-quality companies are also often defined as safe and stable. A company exhibiting excessive 
leverage carries greater risk of financial distress, since it may be jeopardizing its ability to service its 
debt. Therefore, safety is often regarded as having a strong balance sheet – low leverage, high current 
ratios and high interest coverage ratios. 
A high-quality company is often regarded as one which generates a stable and persistent stream of 
earnings, since this might indicate the presence of a competitive advantage, good management and a 
strong market position. Furthermore, earnings stability can be measured by both the volatility of 
earnings, or profitability metrics such as ROE and ROA, and by its growth. Earnings variability 
tends to vary by industry and by company age, where younger companies exhibit more volatile 
earnings than more established, older companies.  
 24 
In the following table, the Quality definition by different authors/practitioners is presented:
Due to the controversy surrounding the definition of quality, a total of 12 metrics from the three 
main categories were chosen to represent the characteristics of Quality. The aim is to perform 
statistical test in order to determine the best proxy for Quality, although this method does imply a 
certain amount of selection bias. To somewhat account for the selection bias, the metrics of choice 
are frequently used individually in previous research, as can be seen from the table above. 
Furthermore, to mitigate the selection bias effect, a higher level of significance is imposed in the 
regressions. ROIC, GP/Assets, CF/Assets, Operating margin, ROE and ROA were chosen to 
represent the profitability characteristic of Quality, Leverage, Debt/Equity and Net debt for the 
Safety category, and EPS Stability, Dividend 5-year growth and Equity Variability as a measure of 
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Earnings.  
Following the methodology of Asness and Frazzini (2013), portfolios for each metric is formed by a 
long position in the quintile of highest ranking stocks for each metric, and short the quintile of 
stocks with the lowest ranking, resulting in 12 net portfolios which are rebalanced yearly.  
In order to construct an aggregated Quality portfolio, each of the fundamental metrics are first 
regressed on the CAPM, Fama French 3 Factor Model, Carhart’s 4 Factor Model and Fama French 5 
Factor Model. The statistical result from these regressions, combined with relevant literature 
regarding the choice of fundamental metrics to represent the Quality characteristics, will form the 
foundation in constructing the aggregated Quality portfolio consisting of three metrics – one from 
each category. 
Once the three metrics have been decided upon, each variable is converted into ranks and 
standardized to obtain a z-score through a methodology that follows that of Asness and Frazzini 
(2013). Thus putting each measure on equal footing and making it possible to combine them. The z-
score is computed as follows: 
𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 = 𝑟𝑟𝑉𝑉𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖) 
Where x is the variable of interest and r the vector of ranks. 
𝑧𝑧(𝑥𝑥) = 𝑧𝑧𝑥𝑥 = (𝑟𝑟 − 𝜇𝜇𝑟𝑟)/𝜎𝜎𝑟𝑟 
Where μr and σr are the cross sectional mean and standard deviation or r. 
𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑉𝑉𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡𝑄𝑄 = 𝑧𝑧(𝑧𝑧𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀 1 + 𝑧𝑧𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀 2 + 𝑧𝑧𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀 3) 
With the Quality factor defined, an aggregated Quality portfolio is formed by a zero-investment 
portfolio, taking a long position in the 20% (10%) highest ranking stocks and a short position in the 
20% (10%) lowest ranking stocks, following the methodology of Fama and French (1993) and 
Asness and Frazzini (2013). The portfolio is then rebalanced yearly. Furthermore, the aggregated 
Quality portfolio is regressed in CAPM, Fama French 3 Factor Model, Carhart’s 4 Factor Model and 
Fama French 5 Factor Model, in order to investigate the portfolios factor loadings.  
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3.4 Decomposing the Quality Screen 
Following the portfolio approach of Fama & Macbeth (1973), Fama and French (1992, 1993 and 
1996) and Asness and Frazzini (2013), the Quality Factor is decomposed by conditional sorts, first 
sorting on size and then on quality. Size is sorted on Small and Big, while Quality is sorted on Low, 
Medium and High, thus forming 2x3 portfolios.  
In order to further investigate the characteristics of Quality, differences in the long Quality portfolios 
and short Quality portfolios are studied. Firstly, the riskiness of High- and Low-Quality stocks is 
assessed by volatility and Beta. Volatility is calculated by a rolling 200day window, while Beta is 
measured with a window of 60 months and the following formula:  
𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 ( 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖, 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖)𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑟𝑟 (𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖)  
 
The average market capitalization in each portfolio is also compared in order to illustrate size-
differences between high- and low-quality stocks. Lastly, the price-to-book ratio is measured, as 
illustrated in 2.5.3, in order to test for price-differences between the two, which can be derived to the 
characteristics of Quality.  
3.5 Fama Macbeth and the Cross Sectional Regression 
Risk factors are frequently used to explain asset returns in asset pricing models, and one of the 
preferred models for this endeavor is the Fama and Macbeth method. This approach involves a two-
pass estimation methodology. The first part consists of estimating market Betas using the linear 
regression model developed in the CAPM framework. Step two involves using these Betas together 
with other variables that are considered important to explain the variation in returns (Fama and 
MacBeth, 1973). Even if this methodology was developed more than 45 years ago, numerous studies 
have relied on it when investigating factors affecting equity return. Skoulakis (2008) suggests that this 
framework is the preferred methodology to determine factor risk premium and cross section of 
returns.   
By following the logic from Fama Macbeth’s cross- sectional approach, we are able to include 
additional risk factors in the model and test to what extent these and the Betas describe the stock 
returns. In this sense, the framework fits the overall purpose of this essay well. However, in empirical 
tests of the CAPM, Black, Jensen, and Scholes (1972), Fama and MacBeth (1973), Fama and French 
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(1992) and Frazzini and Pedersen (2013), come to a similar conclusion; the market Beta is smaller 
than what is predicted by the CAPM. Furthermore, Davis, Fama, and French (2000) find a similar 
result for the multivariate Beta in the Fama-French Three Factor Model. Their findings suggest that 
the predictions of models that include a standard market factor are too high for assets with market 
Betas greater than 1.0 and too low for assets with Betas less than 1.0. In this sense, the argument for 
using a cross sectional model is strong, however, there are also some drawbacks since the estimation 
of Beta impose some difficulties, more on this later.  
The general cross-sectional model, which is used in this essay, is:  
𝑹𝑹𝑖𝑖 =  𝛾𝛾0𝑖𝑖𝜄𝜄 + 𝛾𝛾1𝑖𝑖 𝜷𝜷𝒎𝒎 + 𝐗𝐗𝒕𝒕𝚪𝚪𝟐𝟐𝒕𝒕 +  𝓔𝓔𝒕𝒕 
Where 𝑹𝑹𝑖𝑖 is the return for each of our sub portfolios for each month, a column vector with 
dimensions 288x1, expressed as returns in excess of the risk-free rate. All prices are calculated as the 
log price change, they are adjusted for dividends (the return is expressed as total return) and the 
prices are adjusted for new stock issuance, buybacks and splits. As a proxy for the risk free rate, the 
three month treasury rate is used, transformed into its monthly equivalent. 
𝚪𝚪2𝑖𝑖 is the (k x 1) vector of the coefficients (γ2𝑖𝑖   , … ,  γ2𝑘𝑘+1,𝑖𝑖   ) of the k:th additional explanatory 
variable, Xt. Since the market Betas are assumed not to be known, the first step in the Fama Macbeth 
regression consists of estimating these by separate time series regression for each portfolio, using the 
following model:  
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  ℰ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
Where i denotes the portfolio, and i = 1, …, 6. The variance of the returns at time t may differ across 
the portfolios, and the returns might be correlated over time. This implies that the disturbance terms 
of the monthly cross-sectional model may be both heteroskedastic and correlated. Therefore, the 
OLS estimator of the parameters of the cross-sectional regression may be inefficient. We therefore 
use the GLS approach to estimate the single index model, outlined above. The following method is 
used to estimate the coefficients: 
 
𝚪𝚪�𝒕𝒕(𝑮𝑮𝑮𝑮𝑮𝑮) = (𝐇𝐇′ 𝚿𝚿𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏𝐇𝐇𝒕𝒕)−𝟏𝟏 𝐇𝐇𝒕𝒕′ 𝚿𝚿𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏𝐑𝐑𝒕𝒕  
 28 
Where, 𝐇𝐇𝒕𝒕 is (N x K+2) matrix containing all the explanatory variables of the model. The properties 
of 𝚿𝚿 makes it possible to derive the best linear unbiased estimator for the Betas, thus obtaining error 
terms that are homoscedastic and exhibit no autocorrelation. 𝚿𝚿 has the following characteristics:  
 
𝚿𝚿𝒕𝒕
−𝟏𝟏 = 𝐏𝐏′𝐏𝐏 
 
Where P is a square, non singular matrix and 𝚿𝚿 is positive definite. Also,  
 
𝐏𝐏𝚿𝚿𝐏𝐏′ = 𝐏𝐏𝐏𝐏−𝟏𝟏(𝐏𝐏′)−𝟏𝟏 𝐏𝐏′ = 𝐈𝐈 
 
Consequently, the following applies:   
𝐄𝐄 [𝐏𝐏𝜺𝜺|𝐗𝐗] = 𝟎𝟎 
 
And,  
𝐕𝐕𝐕𝐕𝐕𝐕 [𝐏𝐏𝜺𝜺|𝐗𝐗] =  𝜎𝜎2𝐏𝐏𝚿𝚿𝐏𝐏′ =  𝜎𝜎2𝐈𝐈 
 
The Gauss Markow assumptions are thus fulfilled. In this sense, we use the heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation consistent (HAC) standard errors, also referred to as Newey–West standard errors, 
for all the regressions. The White covariance matrix assumes that the residuals of the estimated 
equation are serially uncorrelated, a fact not observed in our data sets. It is a well-known fact that 
financial data tend to exhibit excess kurtosis and volatility clustering, so it is not reasonable to 
anticipate that the residuals are serially uncorrelated. Therefore, the HAC consistent covariances are 
a better fit. Furthermore, we test for autocorrelation using the Durbin–Watson test (Durbin and 
Watson, 1950).  A value close to 2 indicates that the first-order autocorrelation coefficient is close to 
zero. If the value however is much smaller than 2, it is an indication of first order autocorrelation. 
  
As mentioned above, there is another issue with financial data in time series analysis. Due to volatility 
clustering effects, the data is not likely to be stationary. Engle (1982) proposed the framework of 
autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (ARCH), which incorporates this mechanism. In the 
ARCH framework, the variance of the error term depends on the squared error terms from previous 
periods. In this essay, we use the augmented Dickey–Fuller (ADF) test to see whether the data is 
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stationary or not, but we do not impose any model on volatility, such as ARCH or GARCH. The 
statistic generated from the ADF test is a negative number, and a low value indicates that the 
hypothesis, the presence of a unit root, is rejected.  
 
Another aspect of GLS is that it might be sensitive to outliers in the data set, since it assigns equal 
weights to all the observations. A popular approach in finance is to winsorize the data set, in order to 
exclude the outliers. Since this method removes data (for instance, it is common the remove the top 
and bottom percentile). We follow this approach to avoid overfitting. Furthermore, all the stocks are 
assigned equal weights. The average stock weighs 0.3 % in our net quality portfolio, based on 
quintiles. This implies that even if a few stocks has some outlying values, this is not likely to affect 
the overall result.  
Important to note is that including the Betas generated from equitation 1 into the cross-sectional 
regression causes errors-in-variables problem. Thus, the Cross Sectional Regression Model will be 
likely to underestimate the Beta and overestimate the other coefficients. The overestimation of the 
other coefficients depends on the level of correlation between the variables (Kim, 1995). Fama and 
MacBeth (1973) addresses this issue by using portfolios instead of individual stocks. However, it is 
important to note that this procedure not entirely solves the errors-in-the-variables problem (Ho, 
Strange and Piesse, 2006). Applying a portfolio approach might on the other hand cause a loss of 
information, an issue discussed by for instance Asgharian and Hansson (2000). Fama and French 
(1992) in contrast to Fama and MacBeth (1973) use portfolios in order to estimate the Betas and 
subsequently assign the Beta values to the individual stocks. The analysis is then carried out on the 
individual stocks (Fama and French, 1992). This approach is also used in this essay, in order to 
mitigate the errors-in-variables problem.  
 
The discussion above constitutes the prerequisites for estimating the Cross Sectional Model, outlined 
below:    
 
𝑹𝑹𝑖𝑖 =  𝛾𝛾0𝑖𝑖𝜄𝜄 + 𝛾𝛾1𝑖𝑖 𝜷𝜷𝒎𝒎 + 𝛾𝛾2𝑖𝑖 𝜷𝜷𝑮𝑮𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺 +  𝛾𝛾3𝑖𝑖 𝜷𝜷𝑯𝑯𝑺𝑺𝑮𝑮+ 𝛾𝛾4𝑖𝑖 𝜷𝜷𝑺𝑺𝑴𝑴𝑺𝑺 + 𝛾𝛾5𝑖𝑖 𝜷𝜷𝑸𝑸𝑸𝑸𝑸𝑸𝑸𝑸𝑸𝑸𝒕𝒕𝑸𝑸 +  𝓔𝓔𝒕𝒕 
 
This model might be subject to autocorrelation, heteroscedasticity and multicollinearity. However, 
according to Verbeek (2012), there is nothing wrong with including variables in a model that are 
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correlated, however this needs to be controlled for to ensure a good fit. We use the Variance 
Inflation Factor (VIF) to detect multicollinearity.  
The VIF is given by the following formula:  
𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝐹𝐹(𝑏𝑏𝑘𝑘) = 11 − 𝑅𝑅𝑘𝑘2  
The VIF indicates the factor by which the variance of bk variables is inflated, compared with the 
hypothetical situation when there is no correlation between the dependent variable and any of the 
other explanatory variables. There is no consensus on how high the VIF can be in order to constitute 
a problem, but if the value is higher than 2.50 (corresponding to a R2 of 0.6), there is clearly a 
correlation issue amongst the factors. We also compare the correlation between the different factors, 
i.e construct both a correlation and a covariance matrix of the underlying data sets for Market, SMB, 
HML, MOM and Quality to investigate the robustness of the regression.  
Once the model is specified, the coefficients of 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 are estimated by using t-statistic values. The t-
statistic values are defined as follows: 
𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗 =  𝛾𝛾�𝑗𝑗𝜎𝜎�( 𝛾𝛾𝚥𝚥)�  
Where  
𝛾𝛾�𝑗𝑗 = 1𝑇𝑇�𝛾𝛾�𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇
𝑖𝑖=1
 
And,  
𝜎𝜎�2�𝛾𝛾�𝑗𝑗� =  1𝑇𝑇 1𝑇𝑇 − 1 �(𝛾𝛾�𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 −  𝛾𝛾�� )2𝑇𝑇
𝑖𝑖=1
 
Where tj follows a t-distribution with (T-1) degrees of freedom. As discussed in section 3.6 the 
conventional level of significance of 2.0 or higher, is considered to be too low due to the process 
employed in selecting the portfolio.  
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3.6 Critical Perspectives 
Numerous researches have raised the possibility that the quality anomaly as well as other anomalies 
may be a result of measurement errors, methodological biases and data mining. As discussed by for 
instance Lo and MacKinlay (1990) and Black (1993), researchers tend to test their hypothesis and 
conduct their analysis on the same investment universe, with the goal to uncover anomalies. Since 
researchers may only publish the most statistically significant findings, the process is prone to 
selection bias. Following this logic, it is not a surprise that an interesting pattern or an anomaly 
emerges from time to time, simply by chance. Another aspect, that is particularly relevant for the 
quality premium, is the fact that it is not well defined and leaves the researches with a lot of choices 
and potential exclusions. In light of this, there have been a lot of discussion regarding to what extent 
the findings are reliable or not, as it is subject to data snooping and selection bias. 
Harvey, Liu and Zhu (2015) discuss this issue, and propose that the t-stat level of 2.0 needs to be 
adjusted upwards, to 3.5 or more, in order to control for the selection bias and data snooping 
aspects. This would imply that many of the papers published by researchers on the quality anomaly 
would not be able to pass the threshold of significance.  
Another methodological aspect, in addition to the multiple testing bias, is overfitting. Novy-Marx 
(2015) states that when combining multiple metrics, each prone to predict high risk adjusted returns, 
conventional two-sided significance tests are no longer reliable. Intuitively, suppose a researcher tests 
25 randomly selected metrics, and then concludes that ten of them predict higher returns, due to 
chance. If these are aggregated and back tested, the performance is likely to be very high.   
 
Another important aspect is firm size. Davis (1994) who investigated the American Stock Market, 
excluded all the small firms, since small firms make up a great portion of the market, and thus may 
skew the findings and making them more difficult to generalize. We do not exclude any firms based 
on size, but it is important to note that this might skew the data. Since smaller firms are likely to be 
affected by idiosyncratic aspects to a greater extent than large firms, the conclusions might not be as 
robust. By dividing our sample in different size categories, it is intended to control for this. 
 
A popular perspective to raise when discussing factor investing is survivorship bias. Most of the 
studies in this field rely on data from the COMPUSTAT or CRSP database. As Kim (1997) and 
Kothari, Shanken and Sloan (1995) describes, there is an element of survivorship bias regardless of 
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what source of information is used. Large and profitable firms are more likely to be entered and 
maintained into the databases. However, this bias was likely more predominant some decades ago, 
since the process of updating data frequently and on a large set of stocks is more convenient today. 
This an important implication as to why we use the Wilshire 5 000 Index, rather than S&P 500 as the 
underlying universe.   
 
Davis (1994) outlines another important aspect, affecting the selection process. Generally, firm 
policies and accounting standards are not coherent over time. To name an example, stock buybacks 
have to a large extent acted as a substitution of dividends since the late 90’s in the US, which for 
instance might impose some selection issues when dividend models are used (Ogden, Jen and 
O`Connor, 2003).  
 
One final aspect to outline is the case of non-synchronous trading. As for example Morelli (2007) 
and Ho, Strange and Piesse (2006) point out, the estimated Beta will not be efficiently estimated, thus 
resulting in an overall spurious regression. Since monthly returns have been used, this effect is to 
some extent mitigated. Furthermore, exclusions of stocks with insufficient data, such as low liquidity 
or missing data due to accounting variables, have been made. 
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4 Empirical Findings 
The fourth chapter of the essay contains the results from data analysis as presented in the methodology. The empirical 
findings, in combination with the theories presented in chapter three, will serve as the foundation for the discussion and 
analysis of the thesis. 
4.1 Building a Quality Screen 
When creating the 12 zero investment portfolios, based on the fundamental metrics as described in 
section 3.3 the results, in terms of significance, varied depending on which factor model the zero 
investment portfolios were regressed on. The alpha for each of the 12 metrics and underlying models 
are presented in appendix 1. 
 
From these results, the metrics with the most significant alpha values, and most consistent data, 
within the three different dimensions of Quality were chosen to act as proxies. From profitability, 
the CF/Assets metric was used. The reason for this is due to data issues; for instance, was 
GP/Assets was inconsistent and for some years, and a large part of the universe lacked information 
for this metric. It was therefore not considered to be representative. Additionally, cash flow metrics 
(accruals) are frequently mentioned in the literature as a suitable proxy for the profitability premium. 
 
From the safety dimension, the leverage metric demonstrated highest significance and was therefore 
selected. EPS stability was chosen as a proxy for the earnings quality premium, since dividend, for 
the same data reason as GP/Assets, was excluded. Furthermore, the spread within the dividend 
metric was very high, thus concluded to be unrepresentative for the equity quality premium. 
 
Below, the factor loadings (Carhart’s Four Factor Model) for the different metrics are presented, for 
each of the dimensions of Quality. Regardless of which dimension the metric belongs to, factor 
loadings differ quite significantly, i.e the dimensions do not tend to be coherent in terms of factor 
loadings.  
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Figure 1 
 
 
Figure 2 
 
 
 
Figure 3 
 
The performance of the three dimensions of Quality are depicted in Appendix 2. 
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As a result of defining the Quality screen, a ranking of our stock universe based on a combined z-
score of the three metrics was enabled. Each of the stocks in the universe was assigned an individual 
rank for each year, and from this the zero investment portfolios were formed. The portfolios 
consisted of long positions in the 20 % (10 %) highest ranking stocks, and short the 20 % (10 %) 
lowest ranking stocks. This resulted in a net Quality portfolio. The net portfolios, presented as both 
deciles and quintiles, are depicted below. The average number of stocks in the quintiles is about 350 
each year, thus considered to be well diversified. The portfolios were rebalanced yearly.    
 
Figure 4 
The graph below shows the cumulative returns from the Quality portfolio, in excess of the Wilshire 
5000 Index. The majority of the excess returns can be linked to adverse equity market conditions. 
  
 
 
Figure 5 
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Below, the zero investment portfolio (consisting of a long position in the 10 % highest quality stocks 
and short the 10 % lowest) is depicted against the performance of Wilshire 5 000. The zero 
investment portfolio performs rather poorly, in comparison to the Wilshire 5 000, during normal and 
strong market conditions, but earns high excess returns in periods of market distress. 
 
 
Figure 6 
The risk and return characteristics of the long Quality portfolio, the SHB portfolio, the S&P500 and 
Wilshire 5 000 are presented in the table below. When compared to the indices, the Quality 
portfolios exhibit higher annualized returns but lower volatility, earning a significantly higher Sharpe-
ratio. Worth noticing is that the SHB portfolio has an average of 165 stocks each year, about half of 
the Quality portfolio. Thus it is not as diversified, and the performance might thus be subject to 
chance, rather than systematic sources of risk.   
 
Annualized returns Annualized volatility Sharpe Max Min 
Long Quality Portfolio 10,15% 13,37% 0,76 16,41% -18,55% 
SHB Quality Portfolio 13,19% 13,36% 1,01 16,69% -17,87% 
S&P500 7,23% 13,36% 0,54 11,38% -17,71% 
Wilshire 5000 7,30% 14,82% 0,49 11,39% -17,74% 
Table 1 
The zero-investment portfolio was then regressed on CAPM, FF3, Carhart’s Four Factor Model and 
FF5. From the table below, we can conclude that the Quality factor exhibits positive, significant 
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alphas across all models. Furthermore, it loads negatively on Beta, SMB and HML, but positively on 
MOM, RMW and CMA. The results of the regressions are depicted below.  
 
alpha Beta SMB HML MOM RMW CMA 
CAPM 0,5161%*** -0,284134*** 
     
FF3 0,549%*** -0,268983*** -0,131828*** -0,070671 
   
Carhart 0,4311%*** -0,211661*** -0,154784*** -0,019977 0,151111*** 
  
FF5 0,4422%*** -0,212143*** -0,095365* -0,179917*** 
 
0,139688* 0,178546* 
Table 2 
The result of corresponding regressions for the SHB portfolio is presented below. The SHB loses 
the significant alpha when regressed on the FF5, which might be due to the high factor loading on 
RMW, i.e the risk return relationship is more or less explained (alpha not significant) by the factor 
loadings. 
 
Alpha Beta SMB HML MOM RMW CMA 
CAPM 0,00383*** 0,808652*** 
     FF3 0,002608** 0,829988*** 0,077547** 0,327369*** 
   Carhart 0,002938** 0,813987*** 0,083955** 0,313219*** .-0,042181* 
  FF5 0,000299 0,952815*** 0,250762*** 0,190301*** 
 
0,487793*** 0,064346 
Table 3 
 
Below, the variance-co-variance matrix for the factors used in our regressions is presented. The 
correlation is quite low, and the VIF is always below 2.5.  
 
 
 
Net Quality RMrf SMB HML MOM RMW CMA 
Net Quality 0,080% 
      
RMrf -0,052% 0,184% 
     
SMB -0,021% 0,032% 0,109% 
    
HML 0,003% -0,019% -0,031% 0,096% 
   
MOM 0,049% -0,058% 0,015% -0,029% 0,252% 
  
RMW 0,025% -0,059% -0,054% 0,037% 0,011% 0,082% 
 
CMA 0,010% -0,031% -0,009% 0,042% 0,005% 0,017% 0,044% 
Table 4 
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Furthermore, Quality exhibits higher persistence than other factors. In the table below, the 
percentage of positive outcomes of a rolling 12 months window of net return is presented for the 
different factors.  
 
SMB HML MOM RMW CMA Quality 
54,9% 56,7% 70,8% 67,9% 61,4% 73,3% 
Table 5 
 
4.2 Conditional Beta Analysis 
Following the research from Pettengill, Sundaram and Mathur (1995), a conditional Beta test was 
performed on the Quality portfolio, with the purpose of understanding how Quality performs during 
different market conditions. The results were not statistically significant, but indicate that a Quality 
strategy earns higher excess returns during bad market conditions than during good. Worth 
mentioning though, is that Quality generates excess returns in both up, as well as down market 
conditions. The results from the conditional Beta test are presented below.  
 
Aggregated Quality Portfolio 
Variable Coefficient Std, Error t-Statistic Prob, 
Alpha 0,008865** 0,00317 2,797098 0,049 
Beta, Up 0,010999 0,012699 0,866153 0,4353 
Beta, Down -0,01218 0,010049 -1,212066 0,2922 
Table 6 
 
4.3 Decomposing the Quality Factor 
In the spirit of Fama and French, we formed sub-portfolios from the findings of our Quality screen 
by sorting on size, and then by Quality. Thus, we ended up with 6 sub portfolios, ranging from High 
to Low Quality, for two sub-universes - small cap stocks and large cap stocks. The returns from the 
6 portfolios are presented below. As can be seen, higher quality outperforms lower quality, regardless 
of size. There is also a tendency for small cap stocks to perform better than large cap stocks, with the 
Small-Cap-Low-Quality portfolio being the exception.  
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Figure 7 
 
4.4 Fama Macbeth (Cross Sectional Regression) and Systematic Risk Premiums 
The regression models from Fama Macbeth (1973) were used to regress the 6 sub-portfolios. 
According to the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM, 𝛾𝛾0 should be equal to 0, and 𝛾𝛾1should be positive, 
indicating a positive market risk premium. In this sense SMB, HML and Quality carries some 
explanatory power in the cross sectional variation of stock returns, however, the results are not high 
enough in terms of t-values. As previously discussed, when several layers of selection is used in 
deriving the portfolio, the t-value should be closer to 3.5 in order to infer significance. This implies 
that we cannot reject that these factors are important in explaining the variation. Neither can we 
reject that alpha differs significantly from zero.  
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  Beta SMB HML MOM Quality 
 𝛾𝛾0 𝛾𝛾1 𝛾𝛾2 𝛾𝛾3 𝛾𝛾4 𝛾𝛾5 
Mean 0,00887 -0,0017 0,0006 0,00393 -0,0156 0,0265 
 Median 0,00164 0,0006 0,00103 0,00222 -0,0052 0,02409 
Skewness 0,172 -0,0663 -0,0565 0,28966 -0,4043 0,06811 
Kurtosis 3,32007 3,54846 6,43597 6,98009 4,46127 2,52242 
Jarque-Bera 2,6493 3,82069 141,824 194,121 33,4689 2,95969 
Sum 2,55551 -0,4856 0,17209 1,13257 -4,4889 7,63236 
Sum Sq. Dev. 2,67935 3,47153 0,90598 0,62628 25,9154 9,53526 
t-stat 1,55844 -0,2602 0,18063 1,42881 -0,8802 2,46737 
Probability 0,2659 0,14803 0 0 0 0,22767 
Table 7 
 
The corresponding coefficients for the portfolios from the cross sectional regressions are presented 
below. There is a clear relation that higher Quality portfolios are associated with a lower Beta, lower 
SMB, lower HML, and higher MOM. All the coefficients for the various sources of risk are depicted, 
as calculated from the Fama Macbeth cross sectional regression. In short, High Quality stocks are 
often larger companies with lower Beta values and high P/B ratios. 
 
 Portfolio Beta SMB HML MOM 
Small Cap 
Stocks 
Low Quality 1,225735 1,023901 -0,00167 -0,21272 
Medium Quality 0,958258 0,731187 0,362973 -0,10568 
High Quality 0,880476 0,665005 0,257789 -0,10064 
Large Cap 
Stocks 
Low Quality 1,206858 0,180431 0,122814 -0,0244 
Medium Quality 1,003436 -0,08184 0,175092 -0,00868 
High Quality 0,912115 -0,13542 -0,18904 0,017724 
Table 8 
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4.5 Comparing Factors 
From the earlier empirical findings, we have seen that Quality is generating returns in excess of the 
market, and produces significant alpha. Below, we illustrate the risk adjusted returns, according to 
Markowitz Mean Variance Optimization approach. In order to compare the return of factors, we 
collected data from other, well documented factors in the equity markets. Due to data issues, the 
time frame spans from January 1999 – January 2017. In addition to investigating other factors, we 
also test how mean variant efficient Quality is in relation to the Wilshire 5 000 Index. 
 
In the optimization setting, maximum weights were set to 20 %. The optimized portfolio generated a 
combination of factors, rather than using the market index.  
 
Factor High Dividend Quality 
Low 
Volatility Russel 2000 Value Momentum Growth Small 
Wilshire 
5 000 
Ann. Return 10,29% 5,82% 9,14% 8,15% 5,82% 3,52% 4,85% 10,22% 5,45% 
Ann. Std 13,60% 13,51% 11,19% 19,68% 15,56% 16,57% 15,15% 18,46% 14,69% 
Sharpe, rf=0 0,76 0,43 0,82 0,41 0,37 0,21 0,32 0,55 0,37 
          
Weights 20,0% 20,0% 20,0% 0,0% 0,0% 20,0% 20,0% 0,0% 0,0% 
Table 9 
 
Below, the Optimized portfolio is presented and compared to the Wilshire 5000 index. The Mean 
Variance Optimized Portfolio performs better in terms of risk-adjusted returns and has less Value at 
Risk, from a historical distributional perspective.  
 
 Annualized returns Annualized Std Sharpe Max drawdown VaR (99,5 %, Basic Historical Simulation) 
Portfolio 6,72% 12 % 0,51 -33,04% 10,6% 
Wilshire 
5 000 5,45% 14,69 % 0,37 -43,97% 11,0% 
Table 10 
 
As illustrated below, the factors chosen mostly engage positions outside the efficient set. All returns 
are presented in excess of the risk free rate.  
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Figure 8 
 
4.6 Descriptive Statistics  
 
4.6.1 Performance Statistics by Sub-Periods  
Further empirical analysis has been conducted during various market conditions, to test the Quality 
factor during shorter time periods. The events below are defined as follows. The Russian/Asian 
crisis is from January 1997 - January 2000, the Dotcom crisis spans from January 2000 - January 
2003, the Great Financial Crisis is measured from January 2007 - January 2010 and the Aftermath of 
the Great Financial Crisis, also including the fiscal crises in Europe, is from January 2010 - January 
2013. The results are depicted below.  
  Alpha Beta SMB HML 
Russian/Asian Crisis 0.011498** 0.564042 0.159239 -0.010890 
Dot-com Bubble 0.005705 0.664003 0.151088 0.044388 
Great Financial Crisis 0.007230*** 1.009342*** 0.766948*** .-0.138088*** 
Aftermath 0.016181** 1.053517 0.687059** -0.321837 
Table 11 
The results can be illustrated further, and below we present the aggregated Quality portfolio in terms 
of annualized returns, volatility and Sharpe-ratio, as well as the market portfolio. Throughout the six 
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year periods, Quality performs in line with the market portfolio, but risk adjusted returns are higher 
during the defined events, i.e in various market distress conditions. 
 
Aggregated Quality Portfolio  
Event/Year Annualized return Annualized Volatility Sharpe Min Monthly Max Monthly 
Russian/Asian Crisis 17,74% 13,33% 1,49 -13,44% 7,43% 
Dot-com Bubble -11,41% 15,34% -0,82 -9,33% 7,65% 
Great Financial Crisis 6,17% 19,19% 0,30 -18,55% 16,41% 
Aftermath 15,91% 19,44% 0,82 -9,59% 15,01% 
      
1993 - 1998 14,39% 10,58% 1,57 -13,44% 7,43% 
1999 - 2004 2,83% 13,13% 0,36 -9,33% 8,47% 
2005 - 2011 10,40% 16,24% 0,64 -18,55% 16,41% 
2012 - 2017 12,98% 13,54% 1,23 -8,74% 15,01% 
Table 12 
 
 
 Market Portfolio (Wilshire 5000)  
Event/Year Annualized return Annualized Volatility Sharpe Min Monthly Max Monthly 
Russian/Asian Crisis 22,86% 17,49% 1,37 -16,08% 7,72% 
Dot-com Bubble -16,37% 20,00% -0,82 -10,72% 7,94% 
Great Financial Crisis -1,24% 17,84% -0,04 -17,23% 10,19% 
Aftermath 12,67% 15,78% 0,88 -7,89% 11,35% 
      
1993 - 1998 16,37% 11,91% 1,74 -16,08% 7,33% 
1999 - 2004 2,32% 15,69% 0,50 -10,72% 8,22% 
2005 - 2011 4,91% 14,74% 0,48 -17,23% 10,19% 
2012 - 2017 13,52% 11,67% 1,40 -7,59% 11,35% 
Table 13 
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4.6.2 Characteristics of Quality 
In the following two figures, Figure 9 and Figure 10, a similar relationship can be observed. Figure 9 
and 10 show monthly excess returns of the Quality portfolio (10% and 20%) and the market excess 
returns. The aggregated Quality portfolio exhibits a mild positive convexity, indicating that it benefits 
from crisis rather than portraying a crash risk. The sample runs from January 1993 to December 
2016.
 
Figure 9 
 
Figure 10 
When studying the characteristics of Quality, by observing the differences in the Long- and Short- 
Quality portfolios, certain features are brought forth. Riskiness, measured by both volatility and Beta, 
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tends to be higher for Low Quality stocks in both cases. The results are illustrated in the figure 
below. 
 
 
Figure 11 
When comparing the size-difference between Low- and High Quality stocks, measured by market 
capitalization, the empirical results portray a positive relationship between quality and size. The 
results are shown in the figure below. 
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Lastly, when investigating price-differences between Low- and High Quality stocks, measured by 
price-to-book ratio, High Quality stocks tend to be more expensive than it Low Quality counterpart. 
This is illustrated in the figure below. 
 
 
Figure 13 
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5 Analysis 
The following chapter contains the analysis and discussion surrounding the empirical findings in relation to the 
theoretical framework presented, relevant to the main topic of the thesis.  
 
When the three dimensions of our proxies for Quality were set up, an interesting feature came to 
light. The first remark can be made regarding the variance and magnitude of significant alphas, for 
each metric in the different regressions. For instance, the net portfolio based on ROIC exhibited 
positive, significant alpha at the 10 % level in the Carhart regression, but not in the other regressions. 
Similar patterns were observed in Dividend, Debt/Equity and Net Debt. The persistence of the 
metrics, and their ability to generate alpha, therefore seem to mostly be a matter of chance and be 
dependent on the sample at hand as well as the time frame. Also, in the CAPM setting only 4 out of 
12 metrics exhibited significance, only 3 out of 12 metrics were significant in FF3, in the Carhart 
model, 5 out of 12 obtained significance, and finally, 5 out of 12 metrics were significant in the FF5 
model (see Appendix 1). Furthermore, the metrics tend to load on different factors, and since the 
selection of metrics imply different factor loadings, the merits of selection are likely to produce 
different results.     
 
The 12 metrics chosen have been frequently used in previous research and they are all, to a varied 
extent, validated in terms of proxies for Quality. However, it is evident that each of the metrics, used 
alone, is subject to selection bias. An interesting finding in the literature is that independently of 
metrics selected to proxy for Quality, there are indications that the combination of metrics should 
capture a “Quality effect”. However, this line of thinking is contradicted by the different factor 
loadings of the metrics. The factor loadings of the metrics in the Profitability screen exhibit the most 
coherent factor loadings, except from ROE. Concerning the other dimensions, Safety and Earnings 
quality, the metrics vary and each of the dimensions exhibit inconsistent patterns (see Figure 1, 2 & 
3). This implies that the metrics are not as coherently defined as in the Profitability screen, indicating 
that factor loadings seem to be linked to the selection of metrics. A more extensive research effort 
regarding how factor loadings vary for different combinations of metrics would therefore be of 
interest. The differences in terms of factor loadings that can be seen from our overall Quality 
portfolio compared to the SHB portfolio, also indicates that a similar selection process of metrics 
may result in different factor loadings (see Table 2 & 3).  
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An interesting note regarding this aspect is that the SHB portfolio loads on other factors whilst 
exhibiting Quality characteristics. The correlation between the two amounts to nearly 80 %, the 
major difference being the higher amplitude found in the SHB portfolio. We interpret this as an 
indication of selection bias in the screen. The SHB screen loads highly on Beta, which is 
contradictory with our Quality screen. Despite the differences in factor loadings, the characteristics 
are similar. Thus, the lack of a coherent Quality screen continues to be a problem when used as 
proxy for Quality.  
 
The aggregation of the three dimensions into a zero investment portfolio indicates that Quality earns 
a lot of the excess returns during bear market conditions. As can be seen in Figure 4, the net 
portfolio generates consequent excess returns during crises. I.e, the spread of High versus Low 
Quality stocks seems to increase during times of distress. This can also be seen in section 4.6, 
Descriptive statistics, that during market distress, Quality performs better than comparable indices.  
 
When the Net Portfolio is regressed on traditional factor models, Quality generates significant 
monthly alpha in between 0.431 - 0.549 %. Furthermore, the Quality portfolio loads significantly 
negative on market Beta, and tendencies are observed on negative factor loadings on SMB and 
HML, although the level of significance varies. It is interesting to note that regardless of factor 
model, the Net Quality Portfolio seems to earn its excess return from filtering out large cap 
companies with stable business models (as indicated by the negative Beta) and higher valuations (as 
indicated by negative loading on HML).  
This result is further emphasized in the Conditional Beta Analysis presented in Table 6. Even if the 
regression does not impose significant result on neither down nor up market conditions, the 
tendency lean towards an increase in excess return during down market conditions. This can also be 
linked to the characteristics of the Low and High Quality portfolios, respectively. As can be seen in 
section 4.6, Figure 11, the risk, measured as either average volatility of all assets in the portfolio or 
average Beta, is lower in the High Quality portfolio. Also, High Quality stocks tend to be more 
expensive (measured as P/B) and larger in terms of market capitalization, as shown in Figure 12 and 
13. The dynamics of the High versus Low Quality portfolios indicates that there are tendencies 
toward flight to Quality. For instance, during the Dot-com bubble, the two portfolios were inversely 
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correlated in terms of average P/B ratios, implying that the highly valuated, pre-crisis, tech stocks 
where not captured by Quality. Not investing in these stocks led to stable returns relative to the 
overall market in the subsequent year. This valuation spread (high tech stocks vs High Quality 
stocks) led to a large spread in the High versus Low Quality portfolios from September 1999 until 
May 2000, thus contributing to earning high returns for the zero investment portfolio. Furthermore, 
there is a spike in volatility and Beta for both portfolios during the great financial crises. Also, the 
spread in terms of volatility and Beta increases dramatically. For instance, the amplitude of the 
volatility is more than 50 % higher for the Low Quality portfolio throughout 2008 - 2009. The fact 
that High Quality exhibits lower market risk seems to be an important source for explaining the risk 
adjusted returns.   
 
When dividing the stock universe into two size categories and conduct a sort based on Quality, it is 
evident that High Quality performs better than Low Quality, irrespective of size. The difference 
between the highest Quality portfolio within the large cap universe, compared to the lowest Quality 
for large cap stocks, is 0,78 % monthly. The corresponding figure for the small cap portfolios 
amounts to 4,14 % monthly. This indicates that our proxy for Quality is significantly higher for small 
cap stocks. Previous research has outlined that there exists a small cap premium in the equity market 
due to un-diversifiable sources of risk. Furthermore, small cap stocks do not tend to be as efficiently 
priced as stocks of larger companies. Thus, our findings are in line with the previous research; the 
magnitude of the premium in the Quality portfolio is higher for small cap stocks, due to either 
market inefficiencies or errors in expectations among investors. However, since the results are 
coherent based on our sort on Quality, we conclude that Quality cannot be rejected to carry a 
systematic source of risk.    
 
Another interesting aspect of the 6 sub-portfolios is, as presented in Table 8, that regardless of size, 
the factor loading on Beta diminishes consequently as Quality increases. Also, lower Quality 
commands negative loading on the Momentum factor. According to the CAPM, low Beta portfolios 
should not exhibit return in excess of the market, as our Quality portfolios do. From this we can 
therefore argue for the presence of a premium that is not explained by traditional factor models.   
 
This, combined with a t-statistic higher than 2 for Quality in the CSR, implies that we cannot reject 
that Quality constitute a systematic risk premium. However, adding Quality to the CSR does not 
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improve the explanatory power sufficiently, to explain all the variation of the stocks, which weakens 
the argument. Also, as Harvey, Liu and Zhu point out, the value of our t-statistic is not a high 
enough level when the process of designing the portfolio is subject to several layers of subjective 
selection.  
 
In a Markowitz optimization setting, the Quality portfolio is “outside” the efficient set. This is also 
the case for the high dividend and low volatility strategies. This should not be possible according to 
the Markowitz framework for extended time periods. As can be seen in Table 9, the most efficient 
portfolio is a combination of factors, and the market portfolio is not assigned any weight. Since the 
factor portfolios have performed well historically, the results are expected and further strengthen the 
argument that factor investing can harvest systematic alpha. However, the Markowitz framework has 
been known to produce unreliable results in terms of future performance and pervasiveness. 
 
Therefore, we conclude that our proxies for Quality aim to capture returns in excess of the market. 
The main questions that remain are why, and if the Quality factor will persist as a source of 
systematic alpha. From the cross sectional regression results, we conclude that we cannot reject that 
Quality is a systematic source of risk, i.e has explanatory power in the cross sectional variation of 
stocks. As previously discussed, there are tendencies that Low Quality underperforms High Quality, 
irrespective of size, and the persistence of the net portfolio is higher than the persistence of other 
factors.  
 
In order to constitute a systematic source of risk, the Quality factor should imply exposures to un-
diversifiable factors such as macro-economic factors, value, size or momentum: premiums that 
command addition return. There is no evident result that points in this direction. Instead, the Quality 
portfolio earns its return in excess of the market during longer time periods and more turbulent 
times. An interesting point to be made in this regard is that investors tend to exhibit irrational 
exuberance and over confidence. During the Dotcom bubble for instance, High Quality was 
“underpriced” relative to Low Quality. The subsequent result was a mean reversion; Low Quality 
stocks fell dramatically, whilst High Quality stocks performed well on a relative basis. This seems to 
be the virtue of High Quality: irrational investor behavior, such as chasing winners, is avoided. The 
correlation between the market and the Quality portfolio is quite high during “normal” market 
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conditions, and the returns are slightly lower during normal market conditions (which is also 
indicated by the lower Beta-values).    
 
Furthermore, when the Quality anomaly is analyzed during shorter time horizons, the anomaly is less 
evident. We believe that this might be consistent with previous research made on investor 
preferences. Most investors have an investment horizon of 3 -5 years, and the Quality anomaly 
becomes evident first during longer time periods or during crises. Thus, there seem to be a holding 
premium for Quality for taking on the horizon risk. Investing in large capitalization, stable stocks 
with low financial risk, does in other words not seem to attract investors with a shorter horizon to 
the same extent as riskier investments (i.e companies with lower P/B ratios). Even if High Quality 
stocks are associated with higher valuations, the pricing of Low Quality stocks are more volatile. 
Also, the average volatility and Beta-values of the individual stocks in the Low Quality portfolio are 
higher. Thus, we conclude that the Quality anomaly rather is a result of the miss-pricing of stocks 
that do not exhibit High Quality traits. It appears to be in times of poor performance of these kinds 
of stocks that High Quality stocks earn most of their returns in excess of the market. This is 
indicated by the mean reversion pattern, shown in for instance Figure 6. Therefore, the results 
indicate that the premium is more likely to be due to systematic errors than a systematic source of 
risk.  
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6 Conclusions 
The four main conclusions from the analysis above, aimed at responding to the central questions and the purpose of the 
thesis, are presented in the section below. 
 
6.1 Lack of coherent definitions impose selection bias 
The first conclusion to be drawn is that there are several elements of selection bias when 
constructing a Quality screen. This applies to several aspects of the Quality anomaly. First, defining 
what metrics to use as a proxy for Quality involves a subjective element. As shown in Figures 1, 2 
and 3, the factor loadings across the three dimensions of Quality differs a lot, implying that even on a 
category level of fundamental metrics, inconsistency can be found. Interesting to note however, is 
that Profitability (Figure 1) shows the least deviation in terms of factor loadings, a finding that aligns 
well with previous research such as Novy-Marx. This also reflects upon the persistence, where 
Profitability exhibits higher persistence than the other dimensions.  
 
Furthermore, the selection bias is also evident when the Quality portfolio is compared to the SHB 
portfolio. Despite a similar process of defining Quality, the factor loadings are quite different, as 
shown in Table 2 and 3. However, both portfolios exhibit significant positive alphas, indicating that 
the usage of a Quality screen captures some premium, and even though the factor loadings differ, the 
correlation between the two amounts to roughly 80 %.  
 
The main conclusion is thus that the difficulty in defining Quality coherently makes it too prone to 
several selection biases, which in turn is likely to affect the overall performance of the Quality factor. 
Still, the return characteristics of both portfolios are left unexplained by traditional factor models, 
indicating a presence of a Quality premium.  
 
All conclusions from this point on will be based on the Quality factor as outlined by this essay. 
 
6.2 High performance in down markets – flight to Quality  
The second conclusion is that stocks that exhibit Quality characteristics earn most of the returns in 
excess of the market during adverse market conditions. This can for instance be inferred from 
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Figures 4, 5 and 6. The peaks in excess returns of the Quality portfolio tend to coincide with the 
various financial crises, and the cumulative excess returns remain relatively flat in the periods in 
between. This is further illustrated in Table 12 and 13, where the Quality portfolio outperforms the 
market portfolio in most of the crisis. Similarly, this is indicated from the Conditional Beta Analysis, 
showing that the benefit of owning Quality stocks is higher when equity markets are in distress.   
 
Another feature amongst Quality stocks is that they are less risky. As illustrated in Figure 12, High 
Quality stocks exhibit lower volatility and Beta than their Low Quality counterparts, thus rendering 
them less risky. The Quality portfolios’ positively convex traits, as shown in Figure 9 and 10, 
indicates a flight to Quality which benefits from crisis rather than implying a crash risk. When 
comparing the Quality portfolio to the Wilshire 5000 index, it is also evident that the Quality 
portfolio is less risky since the Sharpe-ratio is higher. This is further strengthened by the fact that the 
Quality portfolio engages a position outside the efficient set, as can be seen in Figure 8.  
 
6.3 Presence of a Quality Premium 
The third major conclusion to be drawn is that there seems to be a systematic premium associated 
with Quality. The portfolio’s performance and consequent alpha cannot be explained by traditional 
factor models, and we find a t-statistic higher than 2 in the CSR, displayed in Table 6. However, 
adding Quality to the CSR does not improve the explanatory power sufficiently, to explain all the 
variation of the stocks. Also, as Harvey, Liu and Zhu point out, the value of our t-statistic is not a 
high enough level when the process of designing the portfolio is subject to several layers of 
subjective selection. Thus, we conclude that Quality cannot be rejected to carry a systematic source 
of risk.  
 
The conclusion above can be extended to the 6 sub-portfolios, sorted on size and Quality. As is 
shown in Table 7, the factor loading on Beta diminishes consequently as Quality increases, regardless 
of size.   
 
The fact that High Quality exhibits lower market risk seems to be an important source for explaining 
the high risk adjusted returns. The high performance relative to the benchmark in benign market 
conditions accounts for the majority of excess returns. This argument, combined with the fact that 
traditional factor models cannot explain the alphas, indicates the existence of a Quality premium.  
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6.4 Systematic errors rather than systematic risk  
The final conclusion to be drawn is that the premium derived from the Quality factor is more likely 
to be due to systematic errors rather than systematic risk. As discussed above, Quality earns the 
majority of its excess return during market distress. A conclusion to be drawn in this sense is linked 
to behavioral aspects. Investing in High Quality stocks leads to a more rational investor behavior, 
such as avoiding chasing winners. The correlation between the market and the Quality portfolio is 
quite high during “normal” market conditions, and the returns are slightly lower during normal 
market conditions.  
 
We thus conclude that the Quality anomaly rather is a result of the miss-pricing of stocks that do not 
exhibit High Quality traits. This is indicated by the mean reversion pattern, shown in for instance 
Figure 6. The phenomena of flight to Quality, shown in Figures 9, 10, further strengthen this 
conclusion. Therefore, the results indicate that the Quality premium is more likely to be due to 
systematic errors, foremost in terms of Low Quality stocks, than a systematic source of risk.  
 
In order to constitute a systematic source of risk, the Quality factor should imply exposures to un-
diversifiable factors such as macro-economic factors, value, size or momentum: premiums that 
command addition return. There is no evident result that points in this direction.  
 
Another aspect strengthening this conclusion is that most investors have an investment horizon of 3 
-5 years, and the Quality anomaly becomes evident first during longer time periods or during crises. 
Thus, there seem to be a holding premium for Quality associated with taking on horizon risk. 
Investing in large capitalization, stable stocks with low financial risk, does in other words not seem to 
attract investors with a shorter horizon to the same extent as riskier investments.  
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7 Future research 
During the process of dissecting the Quality anomaly in order to answer the main questions of the thesis, certain 
elements and indication have been brought forth which are subject to further research. These findings are presented in the 
chapter below.  
 
When constructing the Quality factor used in this thesis, it became evident that the factor loadings 
varied between the metrics, even in regards to factors of the same category. Subsequently, the factor 
loadings of the Quality factor based on a combination of metrics might therefore differ, conditional 
on which metrics are chosen to proxy for the factor. Further research in regards to the factor 
loadings of the metrics, as well as the persistence of the metrics, would therefore be beneficial for 
defining a Quality factor, and suitable metrics to proxy for it.  The differences in terms of factor 
loadings that can be seen from our overall Quality portfolio compared to the SHB portfolio, also 
indicates that a similar selection process of metrics may result in different factor loadings (see Table 
2 & 3). 
Another interesting topic to investigate further, is whether different Quality screens can be proxied 
for by other factors, such as low volatility or dividend strategies. The similarities in terms of risk and 
return of these strategies, outlined briefly in this essay, indicates that there might be some common 
sources that generate the excess returns. As such, it would be interesting to see if there are any 
common elements in terms of risk premiums, which carry explanatory power.  
Furthermore, Liquidity is a commonly used risk factor in explaining returns. It would therefore be of 
interest to adjust the Quality Screen, and for instance form sub portfolios sorted on Liquidity. It 
would also be interesting to conduct a CSR based on this kind of screen, to further dissect the 
Quality Anomaly in equity returns.  
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Appendix  
Alfa ROIC GP/Assets CF/Assets Operating Margin ROE ROA 
CAPM 0.001655 0.007089*** 0.006121*** 0.004608 0.002240 0.003139 
FF3 0.000753 0.007797*** 0.005577*** 0.002688 0.001494 0.002566 
Carhart 0.002095* 0.007094*** 0.004311** 0.001217 0.000154 0.001972 
FF5 0,000082 0.006265*** 0,002245 0.000343 -0.001511 0.000452 
       
Alfa Leverage Debt / Equity Net Debt EPS Stability Dividend Equity Var 
CAPM -0.002909 -0.001777 -0.001566 0.002706* 0.002347** 0.002631 
FF3 0.004497*** 0.001207 0.001665 0.001647 0.001386 0.000878 
Carhart 0.004130*** 0.000514 0.001185 0.002533* 0.001464 0.000752 
FF5 0.006125*** 0.003205* 0.004595** 0.002221 0.001892* 0.002777 
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Appendix 2 
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DWCF LONG Profitability Safety Quality of earnings
